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LAW MATTERS
JOHN N. DROBAK*
Let us represent the human experience to date as a 24-hour clock in which
the beginning consists of the time (apparently in Africa between four and five
million years ago) when humans became distinct from other primates. Then
the beginning of so-called civilization occurs with the development of
agriculture and permanent settlement in about 8000 B.C. in the Fertile
Crescent-in the last three or four minutes of the clock. For the other twenty-
three hours and fifty-six or fifty-seven minutes, humans remain hunters and
gatherers and while population grows it does so at a very slow pace.
Now if we make a new 24-hour clock for the time of civilization-the ten
thousand years from the development of agriculture to the present-the pace
of change appears to be very slow for the first twelve hours, although our
archaeological knowledge is very limited . . . . The pace of change
accelerates in the past five thousand years with the rise and then decline of
economies and civilizations.... The last 250 years-just thirty-five minutes
on our new 24-hour clock-are the era of modem economic growth
accompanied by a population explosion that now puts the world population
in excess of five billion.'
This improvement in economic well-being is the greatest change in the
history of human life. The drastic strides over the past 250 years are stunning.
The average person today takes advantage of things that the wealth of kings
and queens could not have purchased 250 years ago-much longer life
expectancy, modem health care, automobile and air travel, household
electricity, central heating and air conditioning, television and radio, and
telecommunications, to name just a few. Why have things improved so
much, especially in the last 250 years?
Neoclassical economic theory has attributed modem economic growth to
a combination of factors: human capital (the amount and skill of labor),
physical capital (machines, factories, agricultural improvements, etc.),
natural resources, technology (human command over nature), and the stock
of knowledge (the understanding of the natural environment). Over the past
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1. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Acceptance Speech upon
receiving the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (Dec. 9, 1993), in 84 AM. ECON.
REv. 359 (1994).
2. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 4 (1981).
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few decades, some economists have begun to emphasize the importance of
one additional component: institutions. These are the "rules of the game" of a
society.3 The "rules" structure human interaction and provide a framework of
incentives that shape economic, political and social organization. Together
with the technology employed, institutions affect economic performance by
determining the transaction and transformation costs that make up the total
costs of production.4 Institutions also affect economic performance by
structuring the political process and the relationship between government and
business. Institutions can be informal or formal. Informal institutions include
such things as norms of behavior, cultural constraints, codes of conduct and
business conventions. Some formal institutions are created by non-
governmental organizations-religious laws, corporate rules of self-
governance and use restrictions imposed by residential groups are some
examples. The most important formal institutions, however, are legal, such as
constitutions, statutes, regulations and decisions of courts and agencies.
The law will always have some impact on the costs of running a market
system. Laws can raise these costs not only by making it more costly to use
the law itself but also by creating incentives for inefficient and less
productive activities. Even if many laws raise the costs only a little,
economic growth will be constrained if the cumulative effect is large. Laws
will be less costly to use if they are clear and transparent because those
qualities lead to better understanding of legal requirements and help to make
legal outcomes more predictable. 5 Clarity and transparency may also
diminish the likelihood of bureaucrats charging bribes or extracting other
favors from those attempting to invoke the law. The appearance of broad
bureaucratic discretion, in the application of complex and opaque laws,
makes it easier for government officials to demand bribes.
There is a core set of laws that help markets become more efficient. Not
only does this core include laws that directly govern private commercial
transactions, it also contains laws that constrain the government's power to
extract wealth. The core must start with a criminal law that provides for
3. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).
4. See Douglass C. North, Prologue, in THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS 3, 6 (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., 1997).
5. The market can sometimes adjust to nontransparent and complex laws and minimize the costs
imposed by those laws. For example, the cumbersome licensing regulations for opening small
businesses in Brazil led to the birth of brokers who handled the licensing requirements, in effect
making licensing a one-stop process for the new business. See Andrew Stone et al., Public Institutions
and Private Transactions: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal and Regulatory Environment for
Business Transactions in Brazil and Chile, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Lee J.
Alston et al. eds., 1996).
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security of both people and property. It is extremely difficult, perhaps
impossible, for sustained economic growth to occur in countries where
extortion, theft and other violent crimes undermine market transactions. The
warlord economies of some African countries and the disruption of market
activities in Russia by the mafia are blatant examples. The breaking of
kneecaps by a competitor is an effective "barrier to entry," but firms need not
worry about that if they operate in countries with effective criminal justice
systems.
A market system depends on some type of commercial law to provide the
framework for transactions. Some rules for exchange are important even in
primitive economies. Therefore, as economies became more complex, with
increased specialization and division of labor, begetting more and complex
transactions, commercial law had to become more specialized. Consequently,
a modem market-based economy depends on various bodies of law. For
example, property, contract, negotiable instrument and debtor-creditor laws
establish property rights and the rules for exchange. Bankruptcy laws smooth
the movement of failing firms out of and back into the market Partnership
and corporate laws provide ways to create useful forms of business entities.
The recent experiences of the formerly Communist countries in Central
Europe, in their attempts to move to a market system, reinforce the
importance of some type of securities law governing emerging capital
markets. Antitrust laws provide the rules for competition in these markets.
Many of these laws governing market transactions allow for flexibility by
the participants in tailoring the rules for their own particular needs. The law
does provide a baseline by establishing a default rule, applicable unless the
parties specify otherwise.6 This is important because it enables the parties to
know ex ante their relative rights and obligations. With rights and obligations
established, the parties are now in a position to contract around the default
rule if they believe some other rule better suits their needs. In a similar
fashion, many of the differences in commercial laws one sees from country
to country do not matter significantly because the market participants in each
country adjust their activities to accommodate the particular terms of the
governing law. For example, firms in the United States and in Europe do just
as well under different types of antitrust laws.7 Thus, in some instances, it
does not matter so much what the law is, only that there is a law.
When parties cannot contract around a legal rule as a result of
6. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
7. Compare Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1997) with Treaty Establishing European
Economic Community, opened for signature Nov. 23, 1957, arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
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impediments to bargaining,8 the terms of the rule become even more
important. Bass v. Gregory,9 one of the series of nuisance cases discussed by
Ronald Coase in The Problem of Social Cost, 10 illustrates this well. That case
involved a suit by the owner of the Jolly Angler pub to establish the legal
right to use a ventilating shaft on a neighbor's land." For over 40 years, the
pub had operated a brewery in its cellar, venting the production process
through a shaft that connected into an old well located in the neighbor's
yard.' 2 When the neighbor blocked the ventilation through the well, the pub
owner sued.' 3 The outcome of the lawsuit established a legal rule with both
short-term and long-term consequences. As Coase saw it, "[t]he economic
problem was to decide which to choose: a lower cost of beer and worsened
amenities in adjoining houses or a higher cost of beer and improved
amenities."' 4 Coase's criteria for making the choice was to maximize the
value of production from both parcels. In Bass the court ruled that the pub
had the right to vent its brewing operations through the well.'5 Assuming the
brewery's established ventilating system added more to productive output
than the neighbor lost, the value of production would have been
maximized. 16 This short-term consequence of the Bass decision was a good
economic result in terms of Coase's criteria. Of course, if the court had
reached the poorer economic outcome by ruling for the neighbor, the parties
could have still reached a desirable result through the neighbor's sale of the
right to the pub owner, assuming no impediments to bargaining. Thus the
short-term goal of maximizing productivity can be reached either way.
The long-term consequences of the Bass decision-the downstream
economic effect-can have an even bigger impact on economic growth. For
example, consider the incentives for future conduct resulting from the Bass
decision. If the defendant had been the pub's neighbor for years, the court
was enforcing a relationship the parties had created over time, in effect
enforcing settled expectations. That is an important, albeit not surprising,
principle worthy of reinforcement. Suppose the neighbor, instead, was a
recent purchaser of the land who was surprised and bothered by the pub's
8. Impediments to bargaining stem from the typical transaction costs involved in negotiating a
deal, as well as the consequences of wealth effects, endorsement effects and bipolar monopolies. See,
e.g., Coase, supra note 6, at 15.
9. 25 Q.B.D. 481 (1890).
10. See Coase, supra note 6.
11. See Bass, 25 Q.B.D. at 481.
12. Seeid. at 481-82.
13. See id.
14. Coase, supra note 6, at 15.
15. See Bass, 25 Q.B.D. at 484.
16. See Coase, supra note 6, at 15.
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exhaust gases. The Bass decision has important lessons for this type of real
estate purchaser as well. First, the buyer must seek a remedy from the seller
of the property, not from the pub or a similarly situated neighbor. Second, the
buyer is obligated to inspect the property, inquiring about the use of visible
aspects of the property, like the well. This prophylactic rule, designed to
encourage physical investigation of the property and prevent problems like
those in Bass from ever arising, has positive downstream economic effects.
On the other hand, one could argue that the Bass court was wrong,
because a ruling for the neighbor would have created an incentive for all
easements (including the right to use someone else's property for ventilation
or exhaust purposes) to be reduced to writing and then recorded on the public
records. This could be said to reduce transaction costs in the aggregate since
a buyer need only rely on the land records and not make a physical
investigation of the property. A ruling for the neighbor, however, probably
would have actually raised aggregate transaction costs because it would have
compelled the unnecessary recording of other untold minor transactions. It
would be helpful to know empirically which ruling would actually reduce
transaction costs, but this appears to be one of those issues that cannot be
resolved empirically. My sense is that the court's ruling for the pub owner
was the one that did the most to further economic growth, both in terms of
short-term productivity and downstream economic effects.
Both criminal and commercial law regulate relations between individuals.
Sustained economic growth also depends upon legal institutions that
constrain government. These necessarily take two forms. First, it is important
that the law somehow prevents governments from acting as a mafia and
extracting wealth for the rulers, without any consideration of the economic
well-being of citizens. Democracy is one solution to this problem, since
citizens can vote out rulers who disregard their economic well-being. A
constitutional structure of government with checks and balances between
various parts of the government and with allocation of various powers to
different branches also constrains rulers from governing solely for their own
self-interest. Second, the history of economic growth in the Western
economies has shown that market participants need to be able to trust the
promises of government.1 7 There are many incentives for a government to
renege on its commitments. This is especially true for financial obligations,
where the short-term financial gain to the state (or to certain groups of voters)
will be seen as outweighing uncertain long-term consequences. In the United
17. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803
(1989).
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States, for example, the contracts clause in the Constitution 8 prohibits state
and local governments from repudiating debt obligation.' 9 Similarly, most
nations prohibit outright expropriation of property. Governments can also
"take" property through various kinds of regulations that fall short of
expropriation. The United States and Germany, to cite two examples, have
constitutional provisions limiting the taking of private property through
excessive regulation.20 The existence of these kinds of provisions, even
though seldom enforced, deter government actions that would otherwise
undermine the credibility of the government and harm the workings of the
market.
Even if a country were to follow the prescription for the "rules of the law"
as described in this essay, it would do little for economic growth unless there
also was a way to effectively enforce the laws. The best laws are worthless
unless they can be enforced. Enforcement can come about in different ways.
Take a breach of contract, for example. The party who desires to breach may
restrain himself (first-party enforcement); the aggrieved party may prevent
the breach through self-help such as by holding security or retaliating in
response to the breach (second-party enforcement); or the aggrieved party
may resort to a court or other body to enforce the contract (third-party
enforcement). Of these, first-party enforcement is the most efficient, least
costly method of enforcement. To the extent that a society, or even a group of
traders, follows norms of behavior that stress adherence to contract
obligations, enforcement costs are minimized. Second-party enforcement can
be difficult to structure and sometimes impossible to achieve in complex
economies. That leaves recourse to the courts (or a comparable tribunal) as
the only feasible enforcement mechanism in many cases. With third-party
enforcement often extremely expensive, countries would help themselves
economically by reinforcing norms that support compliance with contract
obligations.
To be effective, third-party enforcement requires honest, unbiased
decisionmakers. That can be difficult to achieve, especially in developing
countries in which judges are paid poorly and in party-dominated countries in
which judges are expected to follow the party line. Many countries are
fortunate enough to have, in general, an honest, unbiased judiciary and
18. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 10, eLl.
19. See John N. Drobak, Credible Commitment in the United States: Substantive and Stnctural
Limits on the Avoidance of Public Debt, in THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS,
supra note 4.
20. See U.S. CONST., amend. V; see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); DONALD P. KOMMERs, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 241-97 (2d ed. 1997).
[VCOL. 76:97
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss1/8
LAW MATTERS
bureaucracy. What leads to that, however, is far from clear. In the United
States, for example, lifetime tenure for federal judges surely helps. The
Constitution allows federal judges to be impeached for "Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."21 The Senate in the early nineteenth
century attempted to use the impeachment clause for political purposes, but
the failure to impeach Justice Chase ended that attempt and minimized the
influence of politics on sitting federal judges. 22 An impartial judiciary also
stems from the socialization of lawyers and judges beginning with their
education in law school -judges are expected to be impartial and to play by
respected and established rules in deciding cases. It also helps that a
judgeship carries a rank of prestige and that lawyers move into judgeships
after achieving at least some financial success. Further, the legal profession
ostracizes a crooked judge, whose legal career is ruined. Finally, the federal
government brings criminal proceedings against dishonest judges frequently
enough to make the threat of criminal conviction another inducement for
honest and unbiased decisionmaking.
Laws dealing with official corruption and bribery are extremely important
for sustained economic growth. Not only do these laws lead to an honest
judiciary and bureaucracy, making dealing with the government more
predictable and less expensive, they also help produce a foundation of trust
and honesty throughout a society. If government leaders, judges and
bureaucrats are corrupt, market participants can more easily justify and
rationalize their own dishonest behavior. This leads to a society in which the
rule of law may be espoused, but is not carried out.2
21. U.S. CONsT., arL I1, § 4.
22. See Irving Dilliard, Samuel Chase, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1978, 185, 195-97 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Isreal eds., 1986).
23. Recent events in the Czech Republic illustrate the relationship between perceived
government corruption-creating uncertainty in the market-and economic growth. After successfully
moving towards privatization faster than any of the other Central European countries, the Czech
Republic's economy regressed in spring 1997 when significant funds flowed out of the Czech stock
market. That outflow of funds was a product of years of ever-increasing concern about fraudulent and
shady activities by businessmen and government officials. The crisis prompted the ruling coalition to
create the equivalent of a Securities and Exchange Commission with laws regulating capital market
transactions, in contrast to the government's earlier efforts to minimize government regulation and
establish a liaise faire economy. In 1995 the ruling party had accepted a large "anonymous" donation,
supposedly from two individuals who turned out to be fictitious. At the time, this event reinforced the
public's suspicion that corruption existed at the highest levels. In fall 1997, two senior members of the
ruling party disclosed that the contribution had come from a Czech businessman who, at the time, had
been actively involved in attempting to buy a large industrial firm as part of the privatization process.
This revelation led to the resignation of the Prime Minister, despite repeated denials from him and
other senior members of the party that they were aware of the true source of the donation. Regardless
of their denials, many citizens continue to believe that accepting such a large anonymous donation was
improper. The toppling of the government is a refreshing sign to many that corruption will no longer
1998]
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While this essay has described the importance of formal law as a
foundation for economic growth, it has also stressed the importance of
informal institutions, such as norms of behavior, that conform to the rule of
law. In economies where the formal institutions are weak, especially in
developing countries, the informal institutions can be the most important
"rules of the game."24 Even in those countries, however, the rule of law,
coupled with effective enforcement, can help the informal norms converge
toward the formal legal rules. Consequently, for purposes of sustained
economic growth, in any country of the world, law matters.
be tolerated by government leaders. Many hope that reinforcing the norms of honesty among the
government leaders will have ripple effects throughout the economy.
24. See text accompanying notes 2-4.
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